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els of category-specific agnosia. However, it is somewhat sur-
prising that well-established research on concept learning and
categorization has had relatively little impact on theoretical and
empirical work in neuropsychology. The basic mechanisms of
categorization and identification are relatively well understood,
but there have been very few attempts to apply standard models
of categorization and identification to category-specific deficits.
I would argue that this is unfortunate, for two reasons. First,
standard theories of categorization can be used to derive precise,
testable predictions about category-specific deficits, and thus
form the basis of a productive research programme. Second, ap-
plying standard theories to category-specific deficits may reveal
which aspects of processing might be altered in patients, with-
out compromising the theory’s ability to explain normal catego-
rization or identification.
Recently, we have proposed that exemplar models of catego-
rization and identification might form the basis of a comprehen-
sive account of category-specific deficits (Lamberts & Shapiro, in
press). Exemplar models, such as Nosofsky’s (1986) Generalized
Context Model, are among the best and most systematic accounts
of categorization and identification across a wide range of stimuli
and conditions. These models assume that category learning in-
volves the storage of specific instances or exemplars in memory,
and that subsequent categorization or identification is based on
the similarity between the stimulus and the exemplars in memory.
Exemplar models not only explain categorization and identifica-
tion, but also the links between these tasks (Nosofsky 1987).
Moreover, they form the basis of detailed accounts of the time
course of category decisions (Lamberts 1995; 2000; Nosofsky &
Palmeri 1997), and their principles underlie what is probably 
the most successful connectionist model of category learning 
(Kruschke 1992).
The exemplar-based account of category-specific deficits is
based on the finding that living and nonliving objects tend to dif-
fer in perceptual similarity. H&F refer to several studies that sug-
gest that living things are more similar to each other than nonliv-
ing things. This difference in similarity structure within the
categories leads to very specific predictions about the nature of
category-specific deficits. An exemplar account would predict that
identification (which is the task of assigning a unique label to an
object) is easiest for objects that have few similar neighbors. If dis-
criminability of objects is low, or if exemplar memory is damaged
(either of which could be the result of brain damage, see Lamberts
& Shapiro, in press; Nosofsky & Zaki 1998), objects with many
similar neighbors will be harder to identify than objects without
similar neighbors. Applied to the living versus nonliving cate-
gories, nonspecific brain damage should lead to a selective im-
pairment of identification of living objects, as observed in the vast
majority of studies.
The exemplar account makes other predictions as well. If the
task is categorization rather than identification (i.e., if objects have
to be assigned to categories that contain more than just one mem-
ber), nonselective damage should have the opposite effect: objects
with similar neighbors in the same category should be categorized
more accurately than objects without similar neighbors in the
same category. This implies that brain damage should impair per-
formance on nonliving objects more than on living objects if cat-
egorization is the task.
From this contrast, it follows that a critical test of the similar-
ity-based account involves a direct comparison between identi-
fication and categorization of different objects. In one such
study, Forde et al. (1997) carried out a number of experiments
with their patient S.R.B., and found that his identification abil-
ity was impaired more for living objects than for nonliving ob-
jects. Forde et al. (1997) also examined S.R.B.’s ability to cate-
gorise living and nonliving things. He was shown line drawings
of fruit, vegetables, animals, and tools and asked to classify them
into their respective categories. S.R.B. scored very highly in this
task. His overall pattern of performance was exactly as predicted
by the exemplar account. Moss et al. (1998) also compared cat-
egorization and identification performance for their patient,
R.C. Tested with the Snodgrass and Vanderwart picture set, R.C.
was able to identify 50% of the pictures of artefacts, compared
to only 9% of pictures of living things. In many cases in which
R.C. failed to name the item, he was still able to provide some
information about it. For 63% of the naming errors made on the
living things in the test set, this included the correct superordi-
nate name (e.g., animal for donkey, or fruit for peach), which in-
dicates that his categorization abilities with these objects were
relatively well preserved. Superordinate names were hardly ever
produced for the nonliving things. Moss et al. (1998) also carried
out a direct test of R.C.’s ability to categorise colour photographs
of living and nonliving objects into their superordinate cate-
gories. R.C. was able to categorise the living things very accu-
rately (93% correct), scoring within the normal range. However,
his ability to categorise the nonliving objects (83% correct) was
below the range for controls. Again, this confirms the exemplar
model’s predictions.
The exemplar account does have some characteristics that make
it an attractive alternative for existing models of category-specific
deficits. The model has been developed outside the neuropsy-
chological literature, and has become one of the best-tested and
most productive theories of perceptual categorization, identifica-
tion and recognition. The model’s simplicity and formal rigour are
further assets. Of course, we cannot claim that exemplar models
readily explain all aspects of category-specificity, but the models’
scope and implications certainly merit further study.
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Abstract: Recent investigations and theorising about category-specific
deficits have begun to focus upon patients with progressive brain disease
such as semantic dementia and Alzheimer’s disease. In this commentary
we briefly review what insights have been gained from studying patients
of this type. We concentrate on four specific issues: the sensory/functional
distinction, correlation between features, neuroanatomical considerations,
and confounding factors.
Although many reports of patients with category-specific disorders
have been based on stable brain-damaged patients (e.g., CVA: Sac-
chett & Humphreys 1992; HSVE: Warrington & Shallice 1984), it
is only relatively recently that data from patients with progressive
brain disease have been used to inform this issue. This is despite
the fact that semantic impairments in progressive disorders such as
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and semantic dementia (SD) were es-
tablished many years ago (e.g., Warrington 1975). We summarise
below some of the insights that have been gained from this source
of data (for a fuller account, see Lambon Ralph et al. 1998b).
The sensory/functional distinction. Although there have been
a number of reported associations between category-specific im-
pairment for living things and relatively poor sensory knowledge
(e.g., Gainotti & Silveri 1996), evidence for the complementary as-
sociation (between nonliving things and functional knowledge) is
sparse. One example was provided by a longitudinal analysis of
definition and naming data of patients with AD (Lambon Ralph
et al. 1997). Although the AD patients did not demonstrate cate-
gory-specific differences in overall performance, Lambon Ralph
et al. (1997) were able to show that a decline in the ability to name
living things was associated with loss of sensory information whilst
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poorer naming of artefacts paralleled degraded functional knowl-
edge. As noted by Humphreys and Forde (H&F), there is an in-
creasing number of single cases that call the causality of this asso-
ciation into question. There are patients with category-specific
deficits for living things with equivalent sensory and functional
knowledge. Patients with semantic dementia, in contrast, seem to
show the opposite combination – although conceptual knowledge
is degraded overall, their ability to give or confirm sensory attri-
butes is particularly affected (Lambon Ralph et al. 1998b 1999).
If one controls for concept familiarity, there is little evidence that
this pattern leads to the predicted category-specific impairment
(Bozeat et al. 2000; Garrard et al., in press a; Lambon Ralph et al.
1998a; 1998b; 1999).
With this issue in mind, we have recently completed analyses of
a feature database collected from intact control subjects (Garrard
et al. 2001). Despite the fact that Shallice and Warrington’s (1984)
original proposal was based upon assumptions about the nature of
those features that distinguished individual concepts, neuropsy-
chological assessments of feature knowledge have not differ-
entiated between shared and distinctive attributes. In the feature
database, we found no difference in the number of distinctive sen-
sory features listed for living and nonliving concepts. The number
of distinctive functional attributes was, as predicted, greater for
artefacts. Further analyses also revealed another category differ-
ence that may prove to be critical. The greater visual overlap/sim-
ilarity of living things noted by H&F, extends to conceptual rep-
resentation themselves. We (see also McRae & Cree, in press)
found that shared features were much more prominent for living
than nonliving concepts.
Correlated features. Explanations of category-specific deficits
that focus upon the importance of intercorrelated features predict
that the direction of the category-difference should be related to
severity (though the two best known positions make opposite pre-
dictions: Gonnerman et al. 1997; Tyler et al. 2000). Two recent
studies including a relatively large number of AD patients found
no positive evidence for either version of the theory (Garrard et
al. 1998; in press c). The first, a cross-sectional analysis, found that
the direction of the category-specific difference was not related to
severity. Rather specific deficits for living or nonliving concepts
were both more likely to be found in the most severely affected
patients. More recently, after adding longitudinal data to the pre-
vious cross-sectional study, we found no positive evidence for the
predicted cross-over in category-differences when plotted as a
function of severity (either in terms of overall disease progression
or the degree of semantic impairment). The lack of an effect in the
target patient group (AD) may be explained by further analyses of
the feature database, noted above. First, the number of signifi-
cantly correlated feature pairs as a proportion of the total number
of possible features pairs is extremely small, suggesting that any
effect of feature co-occurrence is likely to be weak. Second, in-
tercorrelation is confounded by feature distinctiveness – it is
shared features that tend to correlate with others, again suggest-
ing that it may be the distribution of shared versus distinctive fea-
tures, which is critical.
Neuroanatomical considerations. Although it did not support
the correlated feature accounts of category-specificity, the cross-
section AD study (Garrard et al. 1998) did find positive evidence
in favour of neuroanatomical influences. Those cases with rela-
tively poor artefact knowledge/naming had more AD pathology in
parietal regions, supporting the predominant view that there is a
temporal versus frontoparietal difference at the heart of category-
specific deficits. The semantic dementia cases are, again, a puzzle
in this regard. The atrophy in these cases (e.g., Mummery et al.
2000) is focused upon the anterolateral aspects of the temporal
lobes bilaterally and includes the inferior temporal gyrus. One
might expect this to lead to relatively poor performance for living
things as is found in some patients with HSVE for whom the dis-
tribution of pathology is somewhat similar (though it tends to in-
volve medial as well as lateral temporal regions bilaterally: Gain-
otti et al. 1995).
Confounding factors. We finish where H&F began. Concept
familiarity strongly influences the accuracy of patients with se-
mantic impairment (Bozeat et al. 2000; Lambon Ralph et al.
1998a) and it certainly explains some, but not necessary all, of the
underlying difference in category-specific cases (e.g., Funnell &
De Mornay Davies 1996). We would argue that familiarity is no
more a “nuisance” or confounding factor than different sensory-
functional weightings of concepts – there is plenty of evidence
that familiarity should be regarded as a critical part of under-
standing this issue. The magnitude of category-differences is re-
duced dramatically once familiarity controlled stimuli are used for
assessment and there are at least three demonstrations of an in-
teraction between category-specific differences and familiarity
(Funnell & De Mornay Davies 1996; Gainotti & Silveri 1996;
Lambon Ralph et al. 1998b). Implemented computational mod-
els of conceptual knowledge show that when familiarity is in-
cluded during training, not only does it influence the models’
overt performance (Lambon Ralph et al., in press), but also the
nature of the derived semantic representations is changed. Fa-
miliar concepts tend to take up greater amounts of the semantic
“space,” making them much less vulnerable to simulated damage
(Rogers & McClelland, submitted).
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Abstract: Humphreys and Forde (H&F) propose that greater within-
category structural similarity makes living things more difficult to name.
However, recent studies show that normal subjects find it easier to name
living than nonliving things when these are matched across category for
potential artefacts. Additionally, at the level of single pixels, visual overlap
appears to be greater for nonliving things.
Two important and related issues in the paper by Humphreys and
Forde (H&F) require examination: (1) What is the evidence that
living things (i.e., with high structural similarity according to
H&F) are more difficult to name than nonliving things (i.e., with
low structural similarity)? and (2) What constitutes structural sim-
ilarity? Does “contour overlap” adequately capture the degree of
structural similarity within categories?
Turning to the first issue, H&F cite several studies to support
the notion that normal subjects make more errors or are slower
to name items with high structural overlap (exclusively living
things: Gaffan & Heywood 1993; Humphreys et al. 1988; Lloyd-
Jones & Humphreys 1997; Vitkovitch et al. 1993). All failed,
however, to match across category for: visual complexity; some
failed to also match for familiarity (Humphreys et al. 1988; Vit-
kovitch et al. 1993); or any variables including name frequency
(Gaffan & Heywood 1993). Hence, the results of these studies
may reflect the influence of the same artefacts that have proved
troublesome in patient studies of category-specific effects. In
contrast to the studies reported by H&F, several more recent
studies have documented better (and faster) naming of living
than nonliving things by normal subjects on sets of stimuli
matched across category for familiarity, visual complexity, and
name frequency. This has been demonstrated using a variety of
paradigms including the rapid presentation paradigm of Gaffan
and Heywood (Laws & Neve 1999) and the naming-to-deadline
paradigm of Vitkovitch et al. (Laws 2000), naming latency (Laws
1999). These points raise two related issues that need to be ad-
dressed by H&F: first, that the results of unmatched studies are
prone to artefact explanations and second, that when matching
has been achieved, these studies contradict a central tenet of the
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